ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In a prior article, I argued that shadow banking is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. 1 In this Article, I argue that the governance structure of shadow banking should be redesigned to make certain investors financially responsible, by reason of their ownership interests, for their firm's liabilities beyond the capital they have invested. 2 This argument challenges the longstanding assumption of the optimality of limited liability.
Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to the decentralized provision of financing outside of traditional banking channels, and thus it is without the need for traditional modes of bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. 3 The shadow banking system is immense, recently estimated at sixty-seven trillion dollars worldwide. 4 Numerous types of firms make up the shadow banking system. They include special purpose entities (SPEs), used in securitization and structured finance transactions to raise financing indirectly through the capital markets, 5 as well as finance companies, hedge funds, money market mutual funds, nonbank governmentsponsored enterprises, securities lenders, and investment banks. 6 Limited liability, this Article contends, is not always optimal for firms that make up the shadow banking system (hereinafter "shadow banking firms"). Limited liability can sometimes make the governance structure of these firms uniquely subject to a market failure that externalizes the systemic costs of taking a risky action. To repair this failure, managers of shadow 2 See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 426 (9th ed. 2009) (defining limited liability as the "liability of a company's owners for nothing more than the capital they have invested in the business").
3 See FIN. STABILITY BD., STRENGTHENING THE OVERSIGHT AND REGULATION OF SHADOW BANKING 1 (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_1204 20c.pdf (describing the shadow banking system as "credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system" (citation omitted)). Shadow banking is sometimes alternatively defined as the provision of financing by any type of financial intermediary that operates without access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees. TOBIAS 5 See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 621. These SPEs include asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), conduits, and structured investment vehicles (commonly known as "SIVs").
Id.
6 Banks themselves can be regarded as shadow banking firms to the extent they facilitate customer financing in an agency capacity, as opposed to making loans or otherwise extending credit to their customers. For example, banks often create SPEs, ABCP conduits, and SIVs. Banks also are important players in repo markets. Id. at 621-22. banking firms should sometimes be required to put more "skin in the game," in order to better align incentives 7 between their firms and society. 8 This Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, the Article sets forth the background for its analysis, including a short history of how corporate limited liability became the norm and an overview of the general academic debate on whether it should be the norm. In Part II, the Article analyzes whether limited liability should be the norm for the governance structure of shadow banking. The Article starts that analysis by proposing a normative framework for rethinking the corporate governance assumptions about limited liability. It then applies that framework to shadow banking. Although limited liability has always been a potential source of externalities, the Article finds that it is a uniquely fertile source of systemic externalities for shadow banking firms, and that current law does not-nor are adaptations to traditional legal remedies likely to-adequately internalize those externalities. To mitigate those externalities, limited liability should be redesigned for shadow banking firms that are governed by conflicted investor-managers. Part III of the Article explores how limited liability could be redesigned, establishing goals for the redesign and testing redesign proposals against those goals. Annex I to the Article provides practical guidance for assessing the costs and benefits of any particular redesign.
This Article does not directly engage whether-or the extent to whichshadow banking should be subject to substantive capital and solvency regulation, or even prohibited. As to the first, it has not historically been customary, at least in the United States, to engage in solvency regulation of firms that are not traditional banks. 9 The Dodd-Frank Act is beginning to change that, with its regulation of certain systemically important financial institutions. 10 Nonetheless, even though the limited-liability rule of corporation law can cause externalities, the government does not generally "take a more active role in assuring the solvency of corporations." 11 In part, this is because government micromanagement of the private sector is not always efficient. 12 Likewise, it might well be unwise to attempt to prohibit shadow banking. Even if that were feasible, shadow banking "has the potential to create both benefit and harm. Empirically, we do not yet know which effect is likely to dominate." 13 Therefore, "financial regulation of shadow banking should . . . strive to examine . . . how to mitigate the potential harm while preserving the potential benefit." 14 That is this Article's goal.
I. BACKGROUND
As background for this Article's analysis of limited liability in the context of shadow banking, the discussion begins by examining, from a historical standpoint, how corporate limited liability became the general norm and then, from a scholarly standpoint, whether it should be the general norm.
A. History of Limited Liability
Limited liability has been called "a distinguishing feature of corporate law-perhaps the distinguishing feature" of corporate law. 15 Yet early corporations did not have limited liability. Because their histories are different, first consider the evolution of limited liability for shareholders of nonbank corporations, then consider that evolution for shareholders of banks. Finally, compare these with the evolution of limited liability outside the United States.
Nonbank Corporations
During the early nineteenth century, for example, unlimited shareholder liability was the norm. 16 The rationale for such unlimited liability was that creditors assured of repayment from shareholders would lend the corporation additional capital. 17 Indirect shareholder liability, which resulted from the corporate power to make assessments, was also a common feature of early nineteenth-century corporations. Legislators initially were willing to allow corporations performing public functions, such as operating turnpikes, toll bridges, and canals, to organize under corporate charters with limited shareholder liability. 19 But they were unwilling to permit limited liability for shareholders of manufacturing corporations. 20 The movement toward general limited liability started in the courts when judges had to determine "whether shareholders were directly liable for corporate debts if the [corporate] charter was silent on shareholder liability." 21 By the mid-nineteenth century, most courts "presum[ed] limited shareholder liability in the absence of any legislative rule." 22 Different courts had different rationales. Some courts, for example, reasoned that because some corporate charters contained express statements imposing direct liability, the absence of those statements in a charter implied an intent not to impose such liability. 23 Other courts wanted to avoid an injustice to shareholders who were both innocent and ignorant of a corporation's mismanagement. 24 Federal courts often relied on a trust fund theory: shareholders are merely residuary owners, reimbursed only after the corporation pays its debts; 25 thus a corporation is like a trust fund in which the capital stock is used for the payment of corporate debts while stockholders are liable only for the amount of capital stock they contribute. 26 Around the same time, legislatures began allowing limited liability, even for shareholders of manufacturing corporations. 27 have been more driven by pragmatic factors. In part, it was responsive to the increasing political influence of industrialists, resulting from the rapid growth of the manufacturing industry. 28 In part, it was responsive to a "flight-of-capital argument" that states failing to legislate limited shareholder liability would suffer a flight of corporate capital to other states that had limited liability. 29 Limited liability did not become universal in the United States, however, until a century later. California, for example, imposed pro rata shareholder liability for all corporate debts and obligations until 1931. 30 This pro rata liability did not appear to cause a flight of corporate capital to other states or otherwise impede California's economic growth. 31 
Banks
Unlike nonbank corporations in which shareholders initially were subject to unlimited liability, bank shareholders initially were subject to (only) double liability-liability for corporate obligations in an amount equal to the par value of their shares. 32 States imposed double liability either by express provisions in state bank charters or in their state constitutions. 33 Congress followed the example of the states and provided for double liability in the National Banking Act of 1863. 34 According to the senator who proposed the provision, its purpose was to provide additional protection to bank creditors and, in effect, to also prevent the bank from engaging in excessively risky operations. 35 28 Id. at 592-93. 29 Dodd, supra note 18, at 1367-68, 1369. There were other, lesser, factors. In Massachusetts, for example, the governor feared that unlimited liability made shares of Massachusetts manufacturing corporations nearly worthless, and therefore brought financial ruin to Massachusetts's families. Id. at 1368. A Massachusetts senator also argued that unlimited liability created a moral hazard problem by enabling manufacturing corporations to obtain credit in an amount in excess of the value of their business assets. Double liability for bank shareholders quickly fell out of favor, however, following the Great Depression. Several factors contributed to its rapid fall from grace, 36 including a perception of unfairness caused by liability of bank shareholders who did not contribute to management decisions 37 and public questioning of its ability to reduce risk given the widespread bank failures. 38 In response, Congress ended double liability for shareholders of national banks and states ended double liability for shareholders of state-chartered banks. 39 Today, "double liability for bank shareholders is a dead letter everywhere." 40 Limited liability is now the general default rule in the United States for shareholders of banks and nonbank corporations. 41 As explained below, the United States is not alone in adopting limited liability.
Limited Liability's Development in Foreign Jurisdictions
Civil law countries in Europe adopted limited liability even earlier than the United States. 42 The move towards limited liability in England is instructive. Joint stock associations, in which members were liable for association debts, were the dominant form of business organization during the early nineteenth century, because corporate charters were difficult and expensive to obtain. 45 Members attempted in various ways to limit their liability, including by inserting the term "limited" in the association's name. 46 At least partly in response, Parliament passed a law facilitating general incorporation but imposing unlimited liability on shareholders with rights of contribution from fellow shareholders. 47 That law also prohibited the corporate charter from limiting liability. 48 Wealthy investors were outraged, being concerned "that creditors would first proceed against them in preference to less wealthy members." 49 They sparked a political debate, arguing that the law would inhibit investment. 50 As a result, Parliament first enacted limited liability for investors in railwaysthen one of England's most successful and growing industries. 51 That soon led to a legislative broadening of limited liability, not only for shareholders of new corporations generally but also for members of new and existing joint stock associations. 52 Shortly thereafter, limited liability was extended to shareholders of banks 53 and insurance companies. 54 
How History Informs the Limited Liability Debate
The historical trend towards limited liability can help to inform the debate. In the United States and England, the legislative trend was heavily influenced by lobbying. In the United States, the legislative trend was also influenced (in a nonbank context) by fear of capital flight to other states. 55 45 55 Subsequent experience suggests, however, that unlimited liability may not necessarily cause capital flight. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (observing that California's pro rata liability rule did not appear to cause a flight of corporate capital to other states); see also Blumberg, supra note 16, at 594 ("In fact, there is little sign that the different legal rules on shareholder liability adversely affected economic development in Massachusetts and Rhode Island during this period."); Dodd, supra note 18, at 1378 ("There is some indication that the early adoption of the limited-liability principle by New Hampshire and Connecticut stimulated the development of the cotton-textile industry in those states. Yet both states continued to lag, as producers of cotton textiles, behind Massachusetts, The judicial progression towards limited liability has more of a "fairness" rationale: to protect innocent shareholders who are not in a "capacity to control" or influence management decisions. 56 This rationale is also part of the justification for shifting from bank-shareholder double liability to limited liability: imposing double liability on bank shareholders who did not contribute to management decisions created a perception of unfairness. 57 The shift from bank-shareholder double liability to limited liability also reflected disappointment that double liability did not prevent the bank failures of the Great Depression. The magnitude of the Great Depression, however, does not make it an appropriate test; its impact overwhelmed even many prudent banks. 58 The historical trend in England towards limited liability likewise can help to inform the debate. The turning point was opposition to unlimited liability by wealthy investors, who feared they would become the ultimate deep pockets for their firms' liabilities. 59 It is unclear, though, whether fully limiting liability was the only way to remove the fear, thereby ensuring investment. Without totally sacrificing the monitoring benefits of shareholder liability, that fear could have been mitigated by partially limiting shareholder liability, such as to double liability or pro rata liability. 60 
B. The General Academic Debate
Next consider the academic debate on whether limited liability should generally be the norm. To that end, the discussion below reviews scholarly challenges to limited liability made prior, and then in response, to the global financial crisis, 61 and then compares those challenges with scholarly justifications for limited liability. 59 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 60 Professor Gerding also argues that the historical trend in England towards limited liability followed a pattern-an expansion of limited liability and liberalization of corporate law rules, followed by a financial boom, then followed by a financial bust-that proceeded like clockwork every ten years from 1825 through the nineteenth century. ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 74-77 (2013).
61 By "global financial crisis," this Article means the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
Scholarly Challenges Prior to the Global Financial Crisis
Scholarly challenges to limited liability initially focused on harm caused by corporate torts. 62 The concern was that limited liability created moral hazard 63 : shareholders whose liability was capped at the value of their equity contribution would want their firms to engage in riskier-and therefore more tort-prone-projects than is socially optimal. 64 To mitigate this suboptimal risk-taking, some scholars advocated pro rata, unlimited shareholder liability; 65 others advocated a control-based liability regime. 66 Under the former, shareholders would be liable for unpaid tort judgments in proportion to their equity ownership of the firm. 67 Under the latter regime, only shareholders with a "capacity to control" 68 their firms would be liable for tort judgments. 69 Scholars also challenged the limited liability of bank shareholders, arguing for a return to double liability. 70 Professors Macey and Miller used historical data on bank failures 71 to argue that banks whose shareholders are 62 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 1879-80 (briefly introducing the existing scholarship proposing to curtail limited liability).
63 Id. at 1882. 64 Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1232-33. I have previously considered an analogous problem-"marginalizing" risk in debt markets. Investors follow the conventional wisdom of risk dispersion-they diversify their investment portfolios to reduce risk. Risk dispersion, however, can lead investors to both underestimate and underprotect against risk due to market failures including information failure, model failure, human processing failure, and collective action failure. This "marginalization" of risk can result in harm to the actual market participants and harm that extends beyond the market participants, such as financial crisis or systemic collapse. 68 A shareholder with the "capacity to control" is a shareholder with a controlling ownership stake in the corporation. Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1271 n.281. These shareholders are uniquely positioned with low-cost access to corporate information and are better able to influence corporate decisions. Id. at 1249-52. Corporations that have a shareholder with the "capacity to control" are more likely to engage in excessively risky activities. See id. at 1258 (explaining that shareholders with the "capacity to control" are more attracted to hazardous activities with small risk of large loss and better able to influence the corporation to engage in these activities). Consequently, "under limited liability, there is a set of risky activities that a company with a dispersed share ownership would not select, but a company with a controlling shareholder would." Id.
69 Id. at 1271; see id. at 1272-79 (detailing the logistics of a control-based liability regime).
70 See supra text accompanying note 32. Recall that double liability meant shareholder liability for obligations in an amount equal to the par value of their shares.
71 Macey and Miller scrutinized the recovery rate of national bank assessments, the liquidation of national banks, the average annual losses from national bank failures, and bank capital ratios. Macey & Miller, supra note 32, at 55-61. subject to double liability may fail less frequently than banks whose shareholders have limited liability. 72 Professor Grossman, an economist, also used historical data to conclude that double liability generally had the effect of reducing risk-taking. 73 These studies countered the dubious narrative that because double liability failed to guarantee bank stability during the Great Depression, it does not reduce risk-taking. 74 
Scholarly Challenges After the Global Financial Crisis
In response to the global financial crisis, scholars have revisited the limited liability debate, focusing on moral hazard as a cause of excessive risktaking in the financial industry. Professor White, an economist, posits that the crisis resulted from the "steady erosion of incentives that induced management to control risk," including investment banks' shift from partnerships with unlimited liability to corporations with limited liability. 75 Professors Hill and Painter have independently made and developed similar arguments. 76 Other scholars, such as Peter Conti-Brown, have echoed these arguments, focusing on the impact of the risk-taking: shareholders protected by limited liability can "pocket the benefits generated by [their firms'] risky activities,"
72 Id. at 32. Immediately following the Great Depression, conventional wisdom was that double liability failed to adequately protect bank creditors and therefore the system needed to be replaced by deposit insurance to better protect bank creditors. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. Macey and Miller, however, concluded that double liability was a successful mechanism for protecting bank creditors and promoting sound banking practices because recoveries from shareholders were good-the recovery rate during this period was approximately fifty-one percent; banks were encouraged to privately transfer assets before failure; banks were encouraged to more cautiously manage assets to avoid shareholder assessment; and banks were allowed to operate with lower capital ratios. 75 White, supra note 7, at 2-3. White suggests that double liability for banks reflected a "superior alignment of liabilities and incentives for shareholders and managers so that the risk-taking temptations of managers were controlled." Id. at 4-6 (supporting this conclusion with numerical examples to demonstrate that the system of double liability incentivized shareholders, senior bank management, and directors to control and reduce risktaking).
76 See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
while the costs of those risky activities is passed on to the government through bailouts and ultimately onto taxpayers. 77 These arguments effectively continue the pre-crisis observation that limited liability theoretically incentivizes risky action. 78 The investment-banking example of the shift from unlimited to limited liability also helps to concretize this observation. 79 Prior to 1970, investment banks were organized as partnerships, with partners facing personal liability for the debts of their firm if it failed. 80 This restrained risk-taking. 81 Generally, a firm's directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders and not to creditors. In a limited context, however, a firm's directors may owe a fiduciary duty to creditors-when the firm is in the vicinity of insolvency. There is, however, no hard and fast rule on which a director can rely. Therefore, it is unclear how a director should balance between protecting creditors and encouraging a corporation to innovate and take appropriate business risks. In practice, corporations take more risks to fulfill their duty to shareholders and ultimately shift the risk on to creditors. Next compare these scholarly challenges to limited liability with the scholarly justifications for limited liability. The traditional scholarly justification for limited liability is the encouragement of equity-capital investment. 85 This so-called "efficiency justification" 86 holds that limited liability creates appropriate incentives for widespread investor participation in equity ownership, especially in large corporations. 87 Besides addressing investor risk aversion, 88 limited liability reduces monitoring costs: an equity investor need not overly worry about monitoring the firm's risky actions (for which the investor could ultimately become liable), 89 nor need an equity investor worry about monitoring the wealth of other shareholders (for whose shareholder liability the investor could ultimately bear under a joint-and-several shareholder liability regime, which could be especially tricky given the free transferability of equity shares). 90 93 See supra text accompanying notes 5-6. 94 Hill and Painter focus on investment banking but nonetheless define the firms they discuss as "most firms that are federally insured banks or bank holding companies; firms that originate, buy, or sell mortgages; firms registered as broker-dealers or investment advisors under the Securities Exchange Act; and at least the larger hedge funds." Hill & Painter, supra note 80, at 1190. Although this definition would, in part, cover the shadow banking system, their article lacks analysis as to whether investment banks might or might not be generally representative of shadow banking firms.
A. Deriving a Normative Framework
Any attempt to rethink assumptions relating to corporate governance should situate that inquiry within a normative framework. Because corporate governance rules are a subset of financial regulation, 95 that inquiry should be situated within a financial regulatory framework. The central purpose of financial regulation is correcting market failures. 96 Of the five general categories of market failures, three are potentially relevant to corporate governance: information failure, agency failure, and externalities (externalizing harm onto third parties). 97 In the shadow banking system, the third market failure-externalities-becomes much more important. That is because the paramount concern posed by the shadow banking system is that it "can, if left unregulated, pose systemic risks to the financial system." 98 Systemic risks, in turn, can cause massive harm to the real economy. 99 In discussing the third market failure, I have argued, however, that "externalities" is a misleading term because it conflates cause and effect. ) (noting that, from the perspective of welfare economists, "it is theoretically correct to consider distributional inequity as an example of market failure").
97 The other two traditional market-failure categories-monopolies and other types of non-competitive markets, and the public goods problem (a form of collective action problem describing the inability of markets to provide goods that, like clean air, are nonexcludable and non-rivalrous, since some parties will want to free ride on public goods when such goods are (inevitably) purchased by others)-do not appear to be relevant to corporate governance, much less to limited liability of shareholders.
98 Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 625; see also KLÁRA BAKK-SIMON ET AL., EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 133, SHADOW BANKING IN THE EURO AREA: AN OVERVIEW 3 (Apr. 2012) (observing that disintermediation is "one of the main sources of financial stability concerns").
99 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 207, 235 (2008) (attempting to estimate the costs of a systemic failure of the financial system, which could go beyond direct economic costs and include indirect "social costs in the form of widespread poverty and unemployment"); cf. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1376 n.109 (2011) (arguing that because financial market participants are able to externalize significant social costs associated with their risk-taking, it is in their interest to take on excessive risks and oppose regulatory efforts to curtail, or increase the costs of, their ability to do so). When discussing the causes of market failures, I have proposed that we substitute for "externalities" the term "responsibility failure"-referring to responsibility for a firm's ability to externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action. 101 This Article will use this more precise terminology.
This Article therefore next analyzes limited liability in the shadow banking system from the standpoint of three market failures: agency failure, information failure, and responsibility failure. To further clarify the terminology, references below to "limited liability" shall mean limited liability of equity investors; references below to "equity investors" shall mean shareholders and other persons, whether or not they own shares of stock, who share in the firm's profits; 102 and references below to "investors" shall mean equity investors.
B. Applying the Framework to Shadow Banking

Limited Liability and Agency Failure
Agency failure refers to conflicts of interest between principals and their agents-in our case, between a firm and its investors on the one hand and the firm's managers on the other hand. 103 Examples would include conflicts between investors of a firm and the firm's officers and directors. This market activities or to estop 'undesirable' activities"). The cause of the market failure is not externalities per se, however; rather, it is the problem with the production of goods and services that resulted in the externalities. The externalities merely signal that a market failure has occurred. Cf. To avoid this circularity, some economists have even questioned whether "externalities" should denote a separate market-failure category. See, e.g., PAPANDREOU, supra, at 99-100 (arguing that the "non-existence of markets" is the actual market failure referred to as "externalities" and that it is "not useful to treat externalities as a subset of market failure, nor for that matter as a cause of market failure"); Zerbe & McCurdy, supra, at 562 (arguing that externalities should not be defined as market failures); cf. id. at 564 (arguing that "a close examination of the market failure concept gives rise to all sorts of definitional problems" related to externalities). 102 This might include, for example, a manager who has a bonus-compensation scheme based on the firm's profits. 103 Because it is not a principal-agent conflict, agency failure does not include the conflict in which investor-managers have strong incentives to take risks that could generate outsized profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk. failure does not appear to be directly relevant to analyzing the limited liability of investors. 104 
Limited Liability and Information Failure
Information failure refers to asymmetric information, or even mutual misinformation, between parties. An example of the former would be the insufficiency of disclosure to completely inform investors of the merits and risks of a highly complex securities investment. 105 Information failure can arise from various causes, including the potential for transaction costs relating to information acquisition to diminish the incentive to acquire such information. 106 This market failure is directly relevant to limited liability. If investors stand only to lose their equity investments in a firm, they will have limited incentives to incur costs monitoring the firm. I next argue, however, that monitoring incentives will be even more limited for investors of shadow banking firms. Among other reasons, it is because those investors may not bear all of the adverse consequences of such limited monitoring. 107 Increasing investor liability can help to increase those monitoring incentives.
That does not fully address, however, the design of the monitoring incentives. Ideally, increasing investor liability should encourage not only monitoring of the firm, qua firm; it also should encourage monitoring of the firm's potential to trigger systemic risk, thereby externalizing risk. I next address that concern.
Limited Liability and Responsibility Failure
In the shadow banking system, limited liability is an important source of responsibility failure that can lead to externalities-and, even more signifi-cantly, to systemic externalities. 108 If a shadow banking firm cannot pay all of the externalized harm for which it becomes liable, the firm's investors will not (qua investors) be financially responsible beyond the capital they have invested. To that extent, limited liability creates moral hazard. 109 Admittedly, limited liability creates moral hazard even outside the shadow banking system. It is widely understood, for example, that "most of a corporate structure's externalities result from the limited-liability rule of corporation law." 110 Moral hazard in shadow banking, however, is more likely to have systemic consequences. There are two reasons why: decentralization makes managers of limited liability shadow banking firms more likely to take risks than managers of other limited liability firms, thereby making shadow banking firms more likely to fail; and disintermediation makes the consequences of a shadow banking firm's failure more likely to be systemic than the consequences of an ordinary firm's failure.
First consider why decentralization makes managers of limited liability shadow banking firms more likely to take risks than managers of other limited liability firms. The relatively small firms, such as hedge funds, that operate in the shadow banking system are often managed directly by their primary investors. 111 Because such investor-managers typically are entitled to a significant share of their firm's profits, 112 they have strong incentives to take risks that could generate large profits. 113 tially generate such outsized profits that investor-managers would gain lifetime financial security. 114 Yet if a risky action exposes their firm to significant liability for externalized harm, limited liability protects those investor-managers from losing more than their invested capital. This is radically unlike the management incentives in non-shadow banking firms. In those firms (such as ordinary business corporations and even traditional banks), senior managers tend to share only indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. Most profits ordinarily are paid to non-manager investors. 115 Furthermore, managers are often invested in maintaining their jobs. 116 They are therefore much less motivated to take actions that risk the firm, such as exposing the firm to significant liability for externalized harm. 117 Managers of limited liability shadow banking firms are thus more likely to take risks than managers of other limited liability firms, thereby making shadow banking firms more likely to fail. 118 That likelihood of failure is furdeals/2010/10/08/how-bill-ackman-stalked-jc-penney/. At the time, Ackman was betting that he could transform J.C. Penney, an extremely risky venture that was met with significant skepticism. If a corporation does badly because a new investment project fails, a manager must rely primarily on other projects undertaken by the same corporation to balance against it. His salary and prospects and his value to a potential new employer would be hurt by poor firm performance."). 118 Shadow banking firms are also more likely to fail than traditional banks because they are not subject to the type of solvency/prudential regulation imposed on traditional banks, see infra note 124, and also because shadow banking firms are not limited in their ther increased by the fact that shadow banking financial intermediation, like traditional bank financial intermediation, often involves the short-term funding of long-term projects. 119 This creates a liquidity risk that the short-term debt cannot be rolled over. A failure to roll over (i.e., refinance) short-term debt could result in the firm's default. 120 The consequences of a shadow banking firm's failure are also more likely to be systemic than the consequences of an ordinary firm's failure. Like traditional banks, shadow banking firms engage in financial intermediation on which the real economy is dependent. Because all financial intermediaries-including shadow banking firms and traditional bankstend to be highly interconnected, the failure of a shadow banking firm could trigger the failures of other financial intermediaries. 121 Such a chain of failures would be the epitome of a systemic event, especially if it materially reduces the availability of financial intermediation. 122 Additionally, the aforesaid short-term funding of long-term projects not only increases the likelihood of a shadow banking firm's failure 123 but can increase the systemic consequences of that failure. Among other reasons, an event that prevents one shadow banking firm from refinancing can also prevent-or can be correlated to other events that also prevent-other shadow banking firms from refinancing. Because shadow banking does not (at least currently) require the type of solvency/prudential regulation imposed on traditional banks, 124 such a correlated failure would be highly systemically activities to financial intermediation so they can also take other types of business risks. shocks" and also observing that the wider range of markets in which financial institutions are engaged has increased the "number of potential channels of propagation of shocks"). 119 SIVs, for example, issue short-term commercial paper to fund long-term projects. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1805. Money-market mutual funds also provide short-term loans to fund long-term projects. Id. Admittedly, the traditional business of banking also uses short-term borrowing from depositors to finance long-term loans to bank customers. Id. at 1806. However, the potential systemic externalities are offset by prudential regulation and deposit insurance. 124 In bank-intermediated finance, systemic externalities, specifically bank runs, are mitigated by prudential regulation and deposit insurance. See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1810-11. In contrast, prudential regulation does not or cannot be applied to many shadow banking firms. Id. at 1811-15. Meanwhile, disintermediation by spurring the short-term funding of long-term projects can mimic the effects of a bank run. Id. at 1807-08. Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act empowers the risky. Economists have identified the failure of shadow banking firms to roll over short-term debt as a contributing factor to the global financial crisis. 125 In summary, although the limited liability of firms can always cause externalities, the limited liability of shadow banking firms is much more likely than the limited liability of non-shadow banking firms to cause systemic externalities. This is certainly a quantitative distinction: systemic externalities can cause much more harm than non-systemic externalities. 126 I next argue that this is also a qualitative distinction.
An important function of law, and in particular tort law, is to operate as a mechanism for internalizing a firm's externalities. By empowering injured third parties to sue a firm for harm, tort law helps to internalize a firm's externalities because the firm will either pay the cost of the externalities ex post through a judgment or will not engage in the activity ex ante to avoid the potential costs of an adverse judgment. Still, limited liability has practical consequences for traditional banking firms: third parties injured by even non-systemic harm are not always able to recover damages that perfectly internalize the harm because the firm causing the harm may have insufficient capital to pay the damages. 127 The consequences of limited liability for shadow banking firms, however, are qualitatively different: third parties injured by systemic harm will have virtually no chance to recover damages that internalize the harm. Although this difference arises partly because shadow banking firms are unlikely to have sufficient capital to pay for the massive and widespread harm caused by a systemic collapse, 128 the conceptual reason for the difference is legal. As explained below, existing law does not-and adaptations to traditional law are unlikely to-effectively internalize that harm. 127 Cf. supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly arguments that limited liability generally encourages firms to engage in riskier, and therefore more tortprone, projects than is socially optimal). Third parties injured by non-systemic harm, specifically tort victims, might not always be able to recover damages. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 1881 ("Already, strong empirical evidence indicates that increasing exposure to tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to exploit limited liability to evade damage claims."). 128 Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 99, at 206 (discussing the extent and magnitude of that harm).
As mentioned, tort law operates as a mechanism for internalizing a firm's externalities. To win their lawsuits, injured third parties normally must show their harm to be a causal 129 and foreseeable 130 consequence of the firm's actions. Third parties injured by systemic harm caused by the firm's actions would unlikely be able to show that, however. Systemic harm can affect a wide range of third parties in unpredictable ways, such as an individual who is forced to close her family-owned restaurant during a systemically caused recession. Nor is it likely that changing the causation-and-foreseeability standard to enable third parties to win those lawsuits would be an efficient solution. 131 At the very least, courts would face a line-drawing problem and would be forced to make complicated decisions as to what systemic externalities should (or should not) be considered compensable.
The analysis has shown that limited liability investors of shadow banking firms lack sufficient monitoring incentives to avoid engaging in systemically risky actions, and that adaptations to traditional legal remedies are unlikely to adequately internalize systemic externalities. I next examine whether redesigning limited liability could be a more efficient solution to this problem. 132 
III. REDESIGNING LIMITED LIABILITY
Because it increases responsibility failure in the shadow banking system, limited liability should be redesigned if the benefits of the redesign outweigh the costs. This Part examines how that might be done.
A. Setting Goals for Redesigning Limited Liability
Any redesign of limited liability should at least take into account its traditional justifications. The goal of the "efficiency" justification is to create incentives for widespread investor participation in equity ownership. 133 Investors have risk aversion; 134 the more risk they are exposed to, the less incentive they will have to invest. Even fully rational investors will refuse to invest if their risk is unlimited, because the expected value of their losses might well exceed the expected value of their gains. 135 Therefore, any redesign of limited liability should attempt not only to minimize investor risk aversion but also to make investors comfortable that the expected value of their potential gains should exceed (by a sufficient margin to encourage investment) the expected value of their potential losses. 136 The most effective way to accomplish that would be to set some type of cap or limit-such as double liability, which a recent study suggests is a "superior alignment of liabilities and incentives" 137 -on the potential liability.
Another traditional justification for limited liability is that it reduces monitoring costs because an investor need not overly worry about monitoring the firm's risky actions, for which the investor could ultimately become liable. 138 In the shadow banking system, this justification should be given less weight because the potential for shadow banking firms to trigger systemic risk may well justify, if not necessitate, increased monitoring.
A related monitoring-cost justification for limited liability is that an investor need not worry about monitoring the wealth of other investors, whose liability the investor could ultimately bear under a joint-and-several liability regime. 139 This risk-including the complications it entails due to the free transferability of equity shares-could be avoided by a redesign, such as double liability, in which any given investor's liability would be independent of the liability of other investors.
Yet another traditional justification for limited liability is that by promoting the free transfer of shares, it serves to create incentives for managers to act efficiently: investors can transfer their shares if managers perform poorly, The final traditional justification for limited liability turns on fairness: that imposing additional liability on investors who did not contribute to management decisions created a perception of unfairness. 142 If, however, such liability is imposed only on investor-managers, which is this Article's shadow banking focus-and perhaps only on investor-managers with the power to "control" the firm-then it should be more consistent with the fairness justification. 143 Moreover, imposing such liability on only those investors would be efficient insofar as it ties the increase in liability to control over risk-taking decisions. 144 In sum, any redesign of limited liability in the shadow banking system should have at least the following goals: (i) it should increase such liability in a way that increases investor incentives to monitor (and guard against) the firm's potential to trigger systemic risk; (ii) it should minimize investor risk aversion and encourage investment by setting a cap on liability sufficient to make investors comfortable that the expected value of their potential gains should exceed, by a sufficient margin, the expected value of their potential losses; (iii) it should discourage cross-investor monitoring by ensuring that any given investor's liability is independent of the liability of other investors; and (iv) to ensure fairness and maintain efficiency, it should increase liability only for investor-managers (because it is that dual nature that creates the real risk).
Because certain of these goals are in tension, no possible redesign of limited liability could ever perfectly achieve all of these aims. For example, the greater the investor liability, the more investment would be discouraged. 145 Any redesign would also have to confront the collective action problem of cross-border capital flight. I have already discussed how increasing investor liability might trigger capital flight between states. 146 Domestically, increasing investor-manager liability under federal law, as opposed to state law, could solve that problem. 147 The collective action problem could also arise internationally, however. If one or more nations increases investor liability, investors may decide to move their money to firms in other nations, creating an international collective action problem. Cross-border cooperation would be needed to help mitigate that problem. 148 Finally, in furthering the first of these goals-increasing investor incentives to monitor and guard against systemic risk-this Article does not claim that systemic risk could be eliminated. 149 Nonetheless, that goal is important because systemic externalities are the externalities most likely to cause widespread and serious harm. 150 
B. Testing Redesign Proposals Against the Goals
This Article does not purport to test all possible proposals to redesign limited liability against the foregoing goals. Consider in the context of the shadow banking system, however, the generalized proposals referenced earlier. 151 Professors Hill and Painter propose using compensation as the test, imposing personal liability on investors that earn over a threshold number (such as $3 million annually). 152 A purely compensation-based test has the drawback, however, that it does not target only investor-managers. Additionally, a compensation-based test might be able to be manipulated by creatively structuring compensation in ways that avoid the test. 153 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman propose the use of pro rata, unlimited investor liability, under which investors would be liable in proportion to their investment. 154 Their proposal has two drawbacks: it may discourage investment because it does not set a cap on liability, and it does not target only investormanagers. Professor Mendelson proposes the use of a control-based liability regime under which only investors with the "capacity to control" would be liable. 155 This proposal should be superior to pro rata, unlimited investor liability because it better aligns the costs of risky activities with control. In a pro rata regime a controlling investor-manager's liability is limited by his share of corporate equity and not his actual influence on risky activities. , http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/public/static/SR-tax-nber.pdf (arguing that each institution should be required to pay a "tax" that is calculated according to the extent to which that institution is likely to contribute to systemic risk). Indeed, the law generally does not require that all externalities be internalized. 156 By the same logic that investors with the "capacity to control" can use their unique position to induce the corporation to engage in excessively risky activities, these investors However, Mendelson's proposal may discourage investment because it does not set a cap on liability.
Furthermore, a drawback to all of these referenced proposals is that they fail to effectively address systemic risk. 157 Any redesign of limited liability must resolve the dilemma that investor-managers would have relatively little incentive to monitor and guard against their firm's potential to trigger systemic risk if, as argued, tort law bars third parties injured by systemic harm from recovering damages. 158 A possible solution to this dilemma would be to couple any increase in limited liability with a privatized systemic risk fund-which would be used to mitigate systemic harm 159 -into which systemically risky shadow banking firms would be required to contribute. 160 Privatizing the funding would help to reduce a shadow banking firm's incentive to create systemic externalities by engaging in financially risky activities; 161 indeed, the likelihood that firms will have to make additional contributions to the fund to replenish bailout monies should motivate them to monitor each other and help control each other's risky behavior. 162 Making investor-managers personally liable, subject to a cap, for shortfalls in their firm's fund contributions would likewise motivate them to monitor and help control their firm's systemically risky behavior. 163 can also use their unique position to limit firm risk. See Mendelson, supra note 16, at 1280-85. 157 Indeed, it is the inherently systemically risky nature of shadow banking that limits this Article's recommendations to the shadow banking sector. I am not suggesting, for example, that limited liability be changed for operating companies that do not engage in financial intermediation, even if such companies are run by dominant shareholders. The consequences of such a company's failure are not likely to be systemic, and-all things being equal-the tort system is more likely to enable injured third parties to recover from the company, thereby helping to internalize the cost of the failure. financial industry) . If the required contributions to the fund were risk-adjusted, fund contributors would also have incentives to report firms that are underpaying. Schwarcz, supra note 149, at 831. 163 Any redesign should attempt to take into account, however, the fairness of making investor-managers of a firm personally liable for that firm's additional fund contributions necessitated by systemic harm caused by other firms.
